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Executive Summary
For well more than a decade, the “endowment model” 
of investing has been synonymous with increasing 
allocations to alternative investment strategies, defined 
largely as hedge funds, private real estate, private equity 
and venture capital and other, generally less liquid or 
illiquid strategies compared to public markets.
This trend towards alternatives continued unabated 
until the financial market crisis, paused and then 
continued the growth path, albeit at a slower rate.  
Today, the largest educational endowments allocate on 
average more than half of their portfolios to alternative 
investment strategies.  More broadly, nonprofits of 
all types regardless of size have generally significant 
allocations to alternatives.  Pension funds, while at much 
lower allocations, have likewise shifted assets toward 
alternatives in an effort to boost investment performance 
and dampen volatility.
Commonfund has long advocated allocations to 
alternatives to enhance returns and, for certain strategies, 
to provide diversified sources of alpha. We were among 
the earliest investors on behalf of our clients in hedge 
funds (1982) and private capital (1988).  More than 
half of Commonfund’s approximately $25 billion in 
assets under management are in alternative investment 
strategies.
This begs the question: have investors been adequately 
compensated with higher risk adjusted returns compared 
to traditional strategies over this period of growth?  And, 
perhaps more important, what should investors expect 
from their allocations to alternative strategies in the 
future?
As presented in the following pages, we believe that there 
is clear academic and empirical evidence that alternative 
investment strategies have contributed significantly to 
portfolio returns over the last 20 years.  And we conclude 
that the fundamental principles that have contributed in 
the past to higher investment returns among alternative 
investment strategies, compared to traditional long 
only equities and bonds, remain largely unchanged as 
we look to the future.  As such, investors that allocate 
capital to alternatives – with the pronounced caveat that 
investment talent matters – should continue to exhibit 
higher performance in comparison to those institutions 
that allocate solely to traditional assets.
But in reference to the noted caveat, allocations to 
alternatives should be reserved for the investor that 
can access top-tier managers, since the distribution of 
returns among alternative managers is far greater than 
it is among traditional managers.  So while a third or 
fourth quartile equity or bond manager may not detract 
significantly from benchmark returns, sub-median (or in 
many cases even median) hedge funds and private capital 
managers will typically lag public indices. 
Executive Summary
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Alternatives have now become the traditional. It is 
interesting to note that while 30 years ago alternatives 
were in fact “alternatives”, they have now become 
mainstream. The latest NACUBO–Commonfund 
Study of Endowments (NCSE) reports that more than 
half of all assets held by university endowments are in a 
broad array of strategies that we refer to as alternatives. 
And while the magnitude of allocations to alternatives 
among endowments and foundations remains skewed to 
the largest pools, institutions of all sizes have increased 
allocations and in the last decade allocations are 
increasing dramatically among other institutional pools, 
most notably pension funds. What has not changed is 
the wide dispersion of returns in alternative investments,  
making manager access and selection key determinants 
of success.
What has propelled and continues to drive this growth 
in alternatives?  Alternative investment strategies are 
included in a portfolio to enhance returns, to reduce risk 
or both.  They are fundamental to the structure of the so-
called “endowment model” of investing which concludes 
that long term asset pools (whether endowments, 
foundations, long-term reserves or pension funds) can 
outperform investors with shorter term time horizons by 
providing capital to less efficient, more complicated, and 
illiquid sectors of the capital markets. 
Today, investment committees, governing boards and 
investment staff of institutional investors that have 
established portfolios of alternative strategies are critically 
assessing whether alternatives still make sense.   Two 
questions are most commonly asked: (1) do alternatives 
provide better risk adjusted performance than traditional 
long only equities and bonds; and (2) are alternatives 
effective portfolio diversifiers?  A related question that 
committees are posing concerns the high fees typically 
associated with alternatives: do the portfolio benefits 
justify the high fees?
A recent article in the “New York Times” authored by 
James Stewart (10/12/2012) added fuel to the debate 
as it argued that alternatives have in fact detracted 
from returns, concluding that a simple 60/40 passively 
managed equity and fixed income portfolio outperforms 
the endowment model.
This paper provides both a retrospective of the last two 
decades of growth in alternatives to assess the extent to 
which alternatives have “worked” and offers a perspective 
on the role and relative importance of alternatives 
going forward. Our analysis concludes that alternatives 
have, in general, contributed significantly to portfolio 
performance over the last twenty years – either by 
Alternatives Reality
This paper provides both a retrospective of the last two decades of growth in alternatives to assess 
the extent to which alternatives have “worked” and offers a perspective on the role and relative 
importance of alternatives going forward.
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Chart II
Alternatives by Strategy | June 30, 2012
Source: NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE)
Chart I
Asset Allocation | June 30, 2012
Steady Inrease of Alternatives Over10 Years
Source: NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE)
providing better returns or reducing volatility.  More 
important, we conclude that thoughtfully constructed 
portfolios that include allocations to alternative 
investment strategies are well-positioned to continue 
to outperform the “traditional” 60/40 benchmark. 
But, simply allocating 20, 30, 40 percent or more to 
alternatives does not ensure success, as the pages that 
follow highlight.  Talent is key and for investors unable to 
gain access to top-tier investment managers, caveat emptor!
For the purpose of this discussion we will focus on 
three specific types of investments that make up a 
majority of the alternative allocations among university 
endowments: private equity, venture capital, and hedge 
funds (because their investment structures are similar, 
we use the term “private capital” to include both private 
equity and venture capital). Real asset strategies – also 
typically viewed as alternatives, including natural 
resources, real estate and commodities – will be a subject 
for another paper.
Chart I below demonstrates the growth of alternatives 
from the NACUBO–Commonfund Study of 
Endowments (NCSE) over the last 10 years. Chart II 
is the breakdown of the alternatives category from the 
NCSE as of June 30, 2012.  
The Early Years –  
Building the Foundation for Change
If we jump in our time machine and go back to the late 
1960’s what we find is that most long-term, mission 
based asset pools were primarily invested in fixed income 
instruments. While some institutions allocated small 
amounts to equities, equities were generally viewed 
as too risky for endowments and foundations. This 
approach all changed with the ground breaking work 
done by the Ford Foundation with the publication in 
1969 of The Law and Lore of Endowment Funds which 
addressed the legal principles governing endowments and 
recommended changes in approaches. A second report, 
Managing Educational Endowments, analyzed investment 
performance and recommended changes in the ways 
endowments managed their assets.  Commonfund 
was founded with a grant from the Ford Foundation, 
commencing operations in July 1971, and the seeds were 
sown for the broad growth of the endowment model, 



















Real Estate 13% 
Venture Capital 7% 
Distressed Debt 4% 
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Over the intervening years endowments dramatically 
increased allocations to equities and decreased allocations 
to fixed income strategies.  Unfortunately, the immediate 
benefit of strong investment performance from this shift 
was elusive: the decade from 1972 and 1982 offered little 
to investors – the Dow Jones Industrial Average went 
from 800 to 860, but bond performance was far worse 
with the U.S. 10-year Treasury Yields rising from 6.2 
percent to 13 percent. During this period most investors 
maintained a simple asset allocation between equities 
and fixed income. For instance, Harvard University’s 
asset allocation was 65 percent equities as represented by 
the S&P 500 and 35 percent bonds as represented by the 
Lehman Bond index. 
During this period we also experienced the nascent 
growth of both private capital and hedge fund investing.  
While the origins of private capital and hedge funds can 
go back well before the 1970’s, much of their modern 
structure that remains with us today were created at 
that time.  (While we look to the late 70’s and early 80’s as 
early history of private capital investing, the concept dates 
back to the post-civil war era but was largely the purview of 
industrialists and investment banks.) The early tenants on 
Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, California, oft-viewed as 
the epicenter of the venture capital industry, set up shop 
in the early 1970’s.  More than 100 hedge funds were 
also in existence at this time as well, expanding from 
simply long short strategies to strategies with increasing 
use of leverage.  But challenging equity markets and the 
bear market of 1973-74 and stock market crash kept 
many institutional investors on the sidelines.  
In the late 1970’s Harvard began investing modestly in 
private capital limited partnerships and also allocated  to 
a small number of co-investments (direct investments 
made into companies generally alongside an existing 
private capital manager). At the time, this type of 
private investing was largely confined to high net worth 
individuals (referred to as “the deals business”) so these 
early partnerships offered Harvard and a small group 
of other institutional investors an opportunity to place 
capital where capital was lacking. In addition, in the 
late 70’s Harvard began to engage in arbitrage activities 
that were primarily the purview of the early hedge funds 
and investment banks (referred to as “side games”).  
Obviously things have changed radically since those 
early years.  Private capital enjoyed a boom from the 
early 1980’s for the next decade propelled by leveraged 
buyouts (more than 2000 LBOs were consummated 
over the period), and a proliferation of new venture 
capital firms looking for the next Apple computer.  
Hedge funds came of age in the mid-80’s, with the great 
success of firms such as Julian Robertson’s Tiger Fund, 
and investors flocked to the industry, with thousands of 
hedge funds being formed.  From then until today, we 
have seen subsequent periods of booms and busts across 
venture capital, private equity and hedge fund industries, 
some perhaps not as memorable as the internet IPO 
boom and subsequent dot-com bust. Remember the 
Super Bowl in January 2000 when 19 internet start-ups 
featured Super Bowl ads – the Pets.com sock puppet 
should have been a clue!
Notwithstanding this period of investment success and 
failure, asset growth among educational endowments 
and other perpetual pools over the period from the 
adoption of the endowment model to today has been 
nothing short of remarkable, providing resources for 
the nonprofit community to fulfill their missions at 
levels not possible in the decades before.  Total inflation-
adjusted endowments held by U.S. colleges and 
universities grew from just over $100 billion in 1989 to 
more than $400 billion in 20081.  So the question, how 
important have alternatives been to this growth?     
Defining Alternatives
While we tend to lump a broad range of alternatives 
into a “bucket” alongside an equities bucket and fixed 
income bucket, alternatives are not an asset class.  Rather 
they are an amalgamation of investment strategies that 
are included in a portfolio for specific purposes: (1) 
growth; (2) deflation hedge; (3) inflation hedge; and 
(4) diversification/uncorrelated alpha depicted in Chart 
III on the following page.  Some alternatives are truly 
risk assets that are in portfolios to generate growth via 
underlying equity exposure, such as venture capital, 
private equity, distressed debt and long short equity 
hedge funds.  Other alternatives may have higher 
correlations to fixed income and thus can be more 
deflationary hedges.  Still other alternatives such as 
commodities, real estate and natural resources are largely 
uncorrelated (over market cycles) with equities and fixed 
income and instead constitute the real assets allocation 
in a portfolio as inflation hedges. Left over among 
1 Source: U.S. GAO report 
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alternative strategies are those – largely certain hedge 
fund strategies – that have no market exposure and exist 
solely as portfolio diversifiers and sources of uncorrelated 
sources of alpha, such as global macro strategies and 
market neutral hedge strategies.
With the exception of commodities (which you can 
index) all of these strategies are highly dependent on 
manager skill and are less liquid than most publicly 
traded equities and fixed income markets. Hedge funds 
will have lock-up provisions that in general range from 
one quarter to one or two years, while private equity and 
venture capital programs are usually 10-12 year or longer 
partnerships. 
A simple way to look at these groups is as follows:
•	 Venture Capital and Private Equity – designed to 
provide enhanced returns relative to public equity 
markets at the “cost” of liquidity
•	 Hedge funds – designed to dampen portfolio 
volatility, protect against market declines and 
provide uncorrelated return streams over market 
cycles
Each of these strategies are now reviewed below in 
greater detail focusing on their historical development in 
the context of how they can impact portfolios now and 
going forward.
Private Equity
In the nascent days of private equity, long-term 
institutional investors used a number of reasons to justify 
allocations to these strategies, including:
•	 Greater alignment of interests between investors and 
the users of capital
•	 Capital scarcity
•	 Market inefficiencies
•	 The use of leverage to boost returns
•	 Diversification benefits
•	 The existence of an “illiquidity premium”
Greater alignment of interests 
At the outset and still today, the private equity 
governance model provides for a clearer alignment 
of interest between the investor, the board and the 
management relative to publicly-held firms. The boards 
of private equity-backed companies usually include 
representatives of General Partners who represent the 
interests of investors. Further, management typically 
owns a significant portion of the equity interest aligning 
them directly in the outcomes. Quite simply, if the 
company does well everyone does well. In addition, 
the carried interest earned by the General Partners on 
realized gains provides significant incentive for capital 
gains. Since the boards consist primarily of direct 
RISK ASSETS/GROWTH DEFLATION HEDGES INFLATION HEDGES DIVERSIFICATION
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investors in the company, the oversight by these boards 
can be more active in contrast to a public company. 
This includes more meetings per year, richer content 
per meeting, greater involvement outside of board 
meetings and active ownership if the company should be 
performing better.
Capital scarcity 
While there have been well-chronicled periods of 
capital overhang in private equity markets during boom 
periods, the early formation of private equity markets 
was characterized by a dearth of capital versus the public 
market. Certainly, as long-term investors it is always 
better to go where capital is in short supply. Entities that 
need capital are more likely to pay up for that capital 
with a willingness to sell at lower prices. Harkening back 
to 1980 the amount of capital raised by private equity 
partnerships was less than 0.05 percent of the stock 
market capitalization. That was truly a buyers’ market.
Market inefficiencies 
The private market in its formative years was much 
more opaque than the public market. Companies didn’t 
necessarily have published financial statements so the 
ability to find investments was much more difficult and 
required more effort, expense and expertise. The resultant 
private market inefficiencies afforded the opportunity for 
astute investors to find and negotiate good opportunities.
Leverage 
Another driver of growth in private equity in the formative 
years was the use of leverage to boost returns.  Particularly in 
the early years of private equity investing, companies could 
be purchased for little cash and a lot of liens. The leveraged 
buyout market (LBO) developed alongside the market 
for “junk bonds” which rose to prominence in the 1980’s. 
Leveraging equity investments at acquisition provided for an 
asymmetric return pattern. Win and a huge multiple went 
to the equity holder; lose and the debt holders take the lion’s 
share of the losses.
Diversification  
A fifth reason for the early growth in private equity was that 
it was considered by most to be a diversifying asset that had 
low correlation to public equities and fixed income. (Note: 
Commonfund has long believed that such diversification 
benefits are significantly overstated.) As we discuss later, such 
diversifying benefits don’t really exist today, as in times of 
stress equities tend to move in lockstep whether in public 
markets, private markets, U.S. or international markets.
Illiquidity premium 
While investors and private equity managers didn’t talk 
about it at the time, there exists – at least in theory – a 
natural illiquidity premium in private equity investing. 
In other words, because private investments cannot be 
easily liquidated they should offer investors a higher 
return than similar investments in a liquid (public) 
market. We have seen this premium historically in less 
liquid public markets such as small cap and Emerging 
Markets and it exists in private markets as well. 
The early days of private equity investing were also 
marked by very limited competition for investor capital. 
The fees earned by such firms in the face of little 
competition were lucrative indeed – and remarkably have 
changed little today even in the face of dramatic industry 
growth.  The 2 and 20 fee structure (representing a two 
percent management fee and 20 percent carried interest 
on profits) was the rule.  In addition, in the early days 
the General Partners took an additional investment 
banking fee that was charged to the investee company. 
There were also some firms that for return purposes 
treated each investment on a standalone basis and 
therefore did not net losers against the winners for the 
carried interest calculation.
Private Equity Today
That was then and this is now. Did private equity fulfill 
its promise, how has it changed in the last three decades 
and what does it look like going forward?
Let’s go through some of the reasons we looked at private 
capital 30 years ago and see if the properties still hold.
Greater alignment of interests 
First, the alignment of interest has not changed. The 
private equity governance model for investors, the board 
and management has not changed. The private equity 
investors who are looking for the returns still sit on 
boards and tightly oversee the management teams which 
normally have significant equity holdings. The private 
equity firm General Partners still closely monitor the 
company, change management when needed and provide 
guidance and assistance to management. This model has 
and should continue to be part of the value proposition 
for this investment strategy.
6Alternatives Reality: What to Expect from Future Allocations December 2013
Capital scarcity 
Second, there has been a significant amount of private 
equity raised over the last decade. Where in the very 
early days the investor base was limited to a narrow range 
of high net worth investors and a few endowments, the 
investor base today has expanded substantially with 
almost every type of long-term investor dipping their 
toes or their whole feet into the private equity waters. 
The question is: has this destroyed the dearth of capital 
argument? The answer is yes and no. There has been a 
lot of capital raised and Chart IV on the right looks at 
the commitment to private equity over the last 30 years. 
We have moved from very small numbers in the early 
80’s to annual capital raises of over $100 billion today. 
However, when this market size is viewed as a percentage 
of the market capitalization of the public equity markets, 
the relative size of private equity remains small and not 
much different than the mid-80’s.  So while there is 
significantly more money in the space, it is still relatively 
small at less than 0.4 percent of public stock market 
capitalization even after a huge up tick in fundraising 
at the end of the boom in 2007. So capital remains 
relatively scarce, but certainly not at the levels of the very 
early days of institutional movement into this space.
The other relevant factor regarding the scarcity of 
capital argument is the amount of “overhang,” defined 
as the committed but uninvested capital. Chart V on 
the right is a graphical representation of this overhang. 
What is quite apparent from this graph is that the 
largest percentage of the overhang remains in the very 
large buyout funds. These are funds that raised a large 
amount of capital, and by and large require transactions 
of significant size.  The ratio of committed to uninvested 
capital among smaller funds which tend to invest in 
smaller and mid-sized companies are relatively in-line 
with historical norms. While it is a possibility that 
the mega funds may move down market and reduce 
the scarcity factor that still largely exists in the middle 
market, most large buyout firms are not organized in a 
way that supports a large number of smaller transactions.
Chart V
Overhang of Uninvested Capital
Source: Preqin as of October 2012
Dry Powder 
($billion) 









Large Buyout ($1.5bn - $4.5bn)
Mid Market ($500mm - $1.5bn)
Small Buyout (<$500mm)
Chart IV
Fundraising | U.S. Private Equity
Dollars in Billions
Source: Thomson One.com Private Equity. Data includes all U.S.-
based funds with strategies marked as “buyouts”, “turnaround/
distressed debt”, “generalist”, and “other private equity/special situa-
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Market inefficiencies 
The opaque nature of privately-held companies has 
not changed much in the last 30 years. However, there 
may be some changes in the offing that may provide 
new capital and more information to a broader base of 
investors. The concept of crowd funding has been talked 
about for several years and would allow the Internet to 
provide investment opportunities to investors outside of 
the General Partner universe. The JOBS Act passed last 
year does allow for small companies to potentially raise 
investment through the Internet, although the SEC and 
CFTC continue to work on the detailed regulations of 
how this would work. As such, it is unlikely this change 
to the regulatory environment will have much impact in 
the next several years. 
There was a similar debate several years ago with respect 
to angel funding and venture capital (would it displace 
or disrupt that space), which ended up having little 
impact as the overall capital available was (and is) too 
small to have any discernible impact on returns for the 
industry as a whole.
Leverage  
In the early days of private equity investing leverage was 
a critical part of the calculation. In fact, we referred to 
private equity strategies then more often as Leveraged 
Buyouts (LBOs) than private equity. LBOs are still 
executed by private capital firms, but its importance has 
diminished.  Today, leverage has become less important, 
and instead, the two other main drivers to returns, 
multiple expansion and growth, have become more 
important in the underlying earnings of the investment. 
Chart VI outlines the change in the “value drivers” of 
private equity over the last 30 years as well as a view 
looking forward. In the 1980’s, more than half of the 
change in values was the result of the use of leverage. In 
the go-go nineties, the greatest contributor to returns 
came from multiple expansion. The decade of 2000 
– 2009 was more evenly balanced between multiple 
expansion and the growth of earnings. As we look 
forward to the 2010’s we believe that the lion’s share of 
returns will come from operational improvement driving 
growth in earnings. This changes the way we think about 
investments today.  In the 1980’s managers that added 
value focused more on financial engineering, today 
it is about finding managers that can have a positive 
impact on improving operations and earnings – during 
fundamental improvement at the company level.
This ability to change the course for a portfolio company 
is, in our view, the biggest determinant of what separates 
top managers from median managers.
Diversification 
The promise of diversification benefits from private 
equity investing which propelled some of its growth over 
the last 30 years has changed.  Historically, at least some 
of the apparent lack of correlation of returns came from 
the way the General Partners marked their positions to 
market. Generally, losing positions were written down 
when the market or operating results were poor and 
winners were not marked until there was an event like 
a new round of financing or a sale of the company for 
price discovery. 
This has changed over the years. New accounting 
pronouncements (ASC 820 and AU-2009-2012) and 
pressure from institutional limited partners have forced 
private equity funds to value based on a number of 
factors. As a result, the volatility of private equity as well 
as the correlation to public equity has increased. Chart 
VII on the following page shows that the correlation 
to public markets has increased over time. (It should, 
however, be noted that this increase is really a change in the 
way the partnerships are marked versus a real change in the 
fundamentals.)
Chart VI
Value Drivers Over Time | U.S. Private Equity 
Sources of Value in Percent
Source: The Boston Consulting Group “The Advantage of Persis-
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Illiquidity premium 
There has been much written about the illiquidity 
premium (also called time frame arbitrage) over the last 
several years with no real consensus. We believe that this 
premium has existed and added to returns.  But we need 
to think about the premium in several dimensions: 
•	 First, investors simply demand higher rates of 
return for illiquid investments. 
•	 Second, the optionality that private equity firms 
have to invest capital when valuations are cheap 
and sell when investment markets are at higher 
prices, enables investors to realize the illiquidity 
premium
•	 Third, and related to the point above, active 
management is an important aspect of creating 
value (justifying the illiquidity premium), and 
skill matters. (Simply buying all illiquid investments 
available at the current market will not necessarily 
provide good returns.) 
•	 And fourth what portion of the illiquidity premium 
that gets paid away to the General Partner in fees. 
In trying to quantify the illiquidity premium, the 
challenge is always to have an “apple to apples” 
comparison.  Most of the reporting done is this area 
looks at reported survey results for private equity funds, 
which can be flawed because of issues surrounding 
survivorship bias and challenges inherent in relevant 
comparisons to public markets2.  What these surveys 
do show is the wide dispersion of results, with the top 
2 Note: private equity performance is typically presented as dollar 
weighted returns (internal rate of return on IRRs) while public mar-
kets are on the basis of time weighted returns.
quartile doing quite well and the bottom quartile doing 
very poorly (again, skill matters!). Top quartile 10-year 
returns of private capital using Thompson Reuters data is 
almost 40 percent higher than the bottom quartile.  
A new study, however, sheds light on the private equity 
premium.  A recent working paper by Harris, Jenkinson 
and Kaplan entitled, Private Equity Performance: What 
Do We Know?, describes one of the most comprehensive 
analyses of the private equity premium done to date. 
The study utilized Burgiss data3 for vintage years 1984 
through 2008 with performance through March 2011. 
The data covers approximately 200 institutional investors 
with 600 fund investments. Burgiss data was used 
because it has a large sample set that minimizes potential 
survivorship bias and permits the use of individual cash 
flows in the analysis. In order to bridge the gap between 
dollar-weighted (used in private markets) and time-
weighted (used in public markets) return comparisons, 
the study calculated Public Market Equivalents (PMEs). 
The PME is calculated by looking at each cash flow into 
a private capital fund and assumes that the equivalent 
dollars are invested in the public market; at the same 
time outflows are discounted using the public market 
return. At the end of the period the analysis compares 
the total value of the private equity investment with 
the value of the public market equivalent. If the value 
is greater than 1.0, private equity did better; if it is 
less than 1.0 public markets outperformed the private 
investment. 
The results of the study show that the average private equity 
to public market equivalents (PMEs) ranged between 1.20 
and 1.27 depending on vintage year. This means that at the 
end of the life of the fund or the end of the study period, 
private equity returns would have resulted in 20 to 27 
percent more dollars compared to public market over the 
time period measured. This translates into more than 3 
percent per year – the equivalent of what we believe to be 
the illiquidity premium over public markets.  The PME for 
the top quartile group of funds was double the median at 
1.42.
Another source of examining returns can be found in 
the NACUBO–Commonfund Survey of Colleges and 
Universities.  This annual survey of approximately 850 
colleges and universities asks the returns of each asset 
3 Burgiss is a private capital information services firm that has data 
on an exceptionally deep pool of private capital partnerships going 
back to the early 1980’s.
Chart VII
Correlations | All Private Equity & S&P 500 Index
5-Year Rolling | January 2000 - March 2013
Source: Bloomberg, Thomson One.com
35% 
89% 
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
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class for the last fiscal year. By performing a straight 
compounded average of these annual returns for specific 
asset classes over the last ten years we can get a view of 
how that asset class has performed. 
Universities, as early adopters to private equity investing, 
have on average the most mature portfolios of any 
institutional investor groups. The compounded average 
takes into account those universities which are fully 
invested as well as those with less mature programs, and 
average returns for the private equity asset class should 
give us a fair representation of what has been experienced 
by a large investor base. Study returns are time-weighted 
and take into account all the costs associated with the 
investments, including manager fees and j-curves. (We 
believe the compounded time-weighted returns are a 
decent approximation of dollar-weighted returns given 
the overall size and cash flow stability of the population 
set.)
The time-weighted return as calculated for private 
equity was 8.4 percent per year over the ten years ended 
June 30, 2012 versus 5.3 percent for the S&P 500 over 
the same time period.  This is consistent with the 3+ 
percent per year illiquidity premium outlined in the 
Kaplan study. Interestingly the larger universities (over 
$1 billion) which have a much higher allocation, and 
presumably more mature programs, did much better 
than the average (11 percent versus the 8.4 percent). 
So what does all this mean?  The illiquidity premium is 
alive and well over the last ten years even though there 
has been a lot of capital raised. When the average is able 
to add 3+ percent returns per year over ten years net 
of fees it does make a substantial difference to a long-
term pool of assets. The active management portion of 
the return (the alpha generated by manager expertise as 
approximated in returns for top quartile managers) may 
be as high as another three percent per year on top of 
illiquidity premium in private equity.
But many still ask, is a 3 percent premium enough 
for the added risk? In many ways the answer is easy. 
If a long-term investor does not need the liquidity, 
any premium is worth taking. There is, however, an 
opportunity cost of any illiquid investment of simply 
not being able to use such capital in the short-term 
to rebalance – that is buying assets that are down and 
selling assets that are up. We estimate this cost to be 
approximately 30 basis points per year. So as long as you 
are not forced to be a seller of illiquid assets in periods 
of stress, the cost of illiquidity is basically the give-up 
associated with not being able to rebalance the portfolio 
for the illiquid piece. As we have written in the past you 
should rebalance the liquid portion of the portfolio at 
least quarterly and look at the entire portfolio including 
the illiquid investments over a three year period.
So where does all that leave us after 30 years? 
Today private equity is a global investment business. 
Substantial assets have been raised to invest in Europe 
and more recently in the Emerging Markets. The 
techniques of U.S. private equity have been transported 
outside the U.S. and that has allowed many of the same 
attributes to pervade in Europe (and other developed 
countries) and the Emerging Markets.
Fees in this space have changed slightly for the better. 
No longer do most managers set fees on individual 
investments; capital gains are generally offset by 
losses before carried interest is paid. There has also 
been a movement on investment banking fees where 
normally between half and all of these fees are shared 
with the limited partners. Other terms such as cash 
flow waterfalls, Key Person provisions, indemnities, 
clawbacks, investment vehicles and others are subject to 
negotiation.
Private equity remains a compelling and viable method 
of gaining exposure to future economic growth in 
the vast sphere of private companies (generally over 
95 percent of all companies in a developed economy 
are private). But it does not come cheaply, even as 
competition for investor capital has grown given the 
extensive costs associated with buying and selling 
companies. Not only have the number of firms gone 
from a handful to thousands, but an investor can build 
a portfolio to cover the globe or just a single country 
thus placing an even greater premium on thoughtful and 
careful selection. 
We do believe that the illiquidity premium (broadly 
defined and after fees) has existed at about 3 percent 
and will continue to provide returns in excess of the 
public market even for the average managers. However, 
getting close to first quartile returns will continue to 
add significant value above the average manager (and 
conversely, bottom quartile firms may struggle to 
consistently outperform public markets).
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In the U.S. we believe the value today is in the middle 
market opportunities where there is less capital available 
in comparison to mega and large buyouts. Operating 
improvements over financial engineering will provide 
the largest returns looking forward. Outside of the U.S., 
we think the growth in Emerging Market economies, 
where private equity is still in a nascent state, will offer 
attractive returns, particularly in sectors not represented 
in narrow public markets. So for investors capable of 
allocating to illiquid strategies, some of the institutional 
equity exposure should be taken in the private markets. 
Venture Capital
Venture capital investing has generally been viewed as 
distinct from private equity even though the strategies 
share a number of common attributes.  Most notably, the 
differences which distinguish venture capital and private 
equity are the sources of return and payout pattern.  A 
look back at the history of venture capital investing and 
how it has evolved to today is informative.  Like private 
equity, in the nascent days of venture investing there were 
a number of reasons for long-term institutional investors 
to allocate capital to these strategies over traditional 
public market equities:
•	 Greater alignment of interests between investors 
and the users of capital
•	 The ability to generate “innovation alpha” by 
investing in disruptive technologies not available in 
public markets
•	 Payoff structure of home runs over strikeouts
•	 Diversification benefits
•	 The existence of an “illiquidity premium”
Alignment of interests 
Similar to private equity, the venture capital governance 
model provides for a clearer alignment of interest between 
the founder/entrepreneur and investors (General Partners) 
over publicly-held firms. Venture firms, in addition to 
providing financial capital, also provide management and 
operational infrastructure and advice to business owners 
and serial entrepreneurs to aid in the ability to generate 
growth, and importantly to generate profitability.
Innovation Alpha and Disruptive Technologies 
The opportunity to invest in early stage companies 
with disruptive technologies and business models offers 
the potential of outsized returns.  Based on history, 
venture returns are highly correlated to macro changes 
in technology. The first wave was in the semi-conductor 
and computing area; the second wave was in the 
personal computer and networking equipment arena; 
the third wave was in the Internet. The latest wave has 
finally come with the advent of mobile communication, 
social media, cloud computing and big data. These 
transformational technologies have provided good 
returns when the transformation begins, but like all 
of these disruptive technology changes, they tend to 
end with significant overcapacity and a few winners 
(and many losers). The key to success is to find those 
firms which can identify the top opportunities and 
entrepreneurs to build a company around the disruptive 
technology. 
Payoff Structure 
Venture capital has a different payout pattern than 
private equity and this contributed to the growth in 
venture commitments over the last three decades.  
Specifically, while private equity looks to get good 
positive returns on a large number of its portfolio 
investments, venture capital investors historically play 
for the home run. They tend to make a large number 
of investments across a number of companies and they 
know that a majority will likely lose money. If all works 
the way it should, these losses will be offset by a few 
home runs, where the returns will be many multiple 
times the initial investment. Home run returns are often 
achieved through a public offering.
Diversification benefits 
Also similar to private equity, the promise of venture 
capital in the early years was that it provided portfolio 
diversification benefits compared to public equity 
markets. And, the pricing of venture portfolios in which 
“losers” were written off and “winners” marked to market 
only on an event (e.g. new financing, exit), contributed 
to the perceived diversification benefit.
Illiquidity premium 
Again, the argument for an illiquidity premium exists 
in that investors are going into a company privately and 
exiting at public market prices. 
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Venture Capital Today
We have concluded that private equity has, in fact, 
delivered on its promise.  The conclusion for venture 
capital is more nuanced, driven in part from the historic 
high level of venture fund raising in the late 1990’s and 
the resultant dot-com crash in 2000.  This equivalent of 
the Dutch tulip bubble of the 17th century may not be 
seen again, but it left an indelible mark on the venture 
industry.  So where do we go from here and how have 
venture markets reacted since the dot-com bubble burst?
Venture capital principles remain unchanged, but we 
believe fundamentally that one cannot scale innovation 
beyond its natural limits and, as such, providing more 
capital lowers returns. Today, a relatively small universe 
of venture capital managers capture the lion’s share of the 
gains. Hence, strong performance is possible while index 
returns suffer. 
Alignment of interests 
The alignment of interest has not changed. However, 
reality has set in and the importance of operating results 
and profitability has returned to venture managers, as has 
the relevance of fund sizes to investment performance.   
Bigger is not better in venture capital.  Not surprisingly 
there was a significant amount of money raised for 
venture investing in the late nineties and early 2000’s on 
the back of the four most dangerous words in investing 
“this time it’s different”. (I remember going to a private 
capital conference in 2000 in which the speaker from 
a prominent venture firm stated that he saw no reason 
why they couldn’t return 100 percent IRRs every year,  
forever.) If ever a statement has signaled the top of a 
cycle this one did. As a result of the large amount of 
money raised with a portion raised by marginal firms, 
there was a significant capital overhang in the 2000’s. 
This certainly contributed to poor returns of the last 
decade. As you can see from Chart VIII, the dollars 
going into venture has gone down as the performance of 
this investment class has been disappointing.
Innovation Alpha and Disruptive Technologies 
Notwithstanding the “lost decade” of venture investing 
from 2000-2008, investors should not “write-off” 
the idea of investments in start-up and early stage 
companies. Venture returns will continue to be driven 
by technology. All you have to do is look at the returns 
associated with the combination of mobile computing 
and changes in social interactions defined as “social 
media”.  Even with the high profile challenges with 
the public offering of Facebook, the funds that made 
investments in this as well as other social media firms 
such as LinkedIn showed outstanding returns. It is hard 
to predict today what future disruptive technologies 
might be, but one thing is certain: we are not done with 
exponential change. Mobile computing is really at the 
beginning phases, the Cloud will spawn new companies 
that take advantage of the computing power that is 
almost free, not to mention robotics, the driverless car 
and nanotechnology. 
Chart VIII
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Payoff Structure 
A key question is whether the “home run/strike out” 
payoff patterns have changed and if so they will become 
more favorable for investors.  In the halcyon days of 
investing in venture, typified by vintage years 1994 
and 1995, the number of investments among top-tier 
managers that were home runs (defined as multiples of 
invested capital, e.g. 3x to 10x and 10x or better) were 
at least 30 percent during those two vintage years, while 
the invested dollars with a loss were in the 40 percent 
range. As the managers entered the bubble phase and 
the subsequent crash we saw the number of losses as a 
percentage of invested assets increase dramatically while 
the triples and home runs (3x or better) decreased to 15 
percent or less with almost no exits at higher than 10x. 
With that change in mind it is no wonder that the first 
ten years of the new millennium were basically a lost 
decade for venture. It should be noted that the more 
recent years still contain many unrealized investments 
and the ultimate multiple may yet increase when those 
investments are realized. 
Managers obviously learned some lessons from the 
bubble and crash. The amount of invested capital that 
lost money fell to about one-half of the venture peak 
levels. It appears from the data that the industry may be 
evolving from a strike-out/home run approach to one in 
which there are more singles and doubles with a smaller 
percentage of strike-outs and home runs. This payoff 
structure is closer to what we have seen in the private 
equity business. Although the promise of the home run 
is still what drives many venture capitalists and those 
institutional investors that continue to commit to this 
strategy.
Diversification benefits 
The diversification benefits of venture investing, 
particularly in periods of capital market stress, no longer 
exist. So while innovation occurs across all market cycles, 
and is not correlated to equity markets, exit strategies 
(e.g. IPOs) exhibit high correlations to public equity 
markets. As equity exposure, venture capital returns thus 
typically move in lock step with public markets.  Chart 
IX to the right shows that the correlation to public 
markets has increased over time. (It should, however, be 
noted that as with private equity, this increase is really a 
change in the way the partnerships are marked versus a 
real change in the fundamentals.)
Illiquidity premium 
Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan also looked at historical 
performance of venture capital returns on a PME basis 
and the results are not as compelling as private equity 
over the same 20 year period.  Clearly venture returns 
over the past two decades have been very volatile, 
reflecting a tale of two decades. Again using Burgiss 
data, while the average PME was 1.36 versus the S&P 
500 over the 25 vintage year period beginning in 
1984, the 1990’s had a PME of 1.99 and the 2000’s 
through vintage year 2008 with performance through 
March 2011 had a PME relative to the S&P 500 of 
only 0.91. In other words, an investor would have been 
better off investing in the liquid stock market than the 
average venture manager from 2000 – 2008. (Note: 
top performing managers did well even in this difficult 
period.) The decade from 1990 – 1999 was driven by the 
Internet bubble. This led to more money being raised 
which led to disappointing returns from 2000 – 2008.  
The NACUBO–Commonfund Study of Endowments 
(NCSE) which had a time-weighted return of 5.76 
percent for the ten years ended June 30, 2012 compared 
to an S&P 500 return of 5.33 percent is consistent with 
the Kaplan analysis.  Just as evident in the Burgiss data, a 
substantial driver of these 10-year returns are a large loss 
in 2003 relative to the S&P 500 reflecting the big write-
downs in 2003 at the tail end of the Internet bubble.  
Chart IX
Correlations | Venture Capital & Russell 2000 Index
5-Year Rolling | January 2000 - March 2013 
Source: Bloomberg, Thomson One.com
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Where does all of this leave us as it relates to venture 
investment? First, we do not believe that we will see 
another bubble like the one that we experienced in the 
late nineties in our lifetime. So as we look forward, in 
this area, we should expect returns that are comparable 
to what we will see in private equity. Not the nineties, 
but not the 2000’s either.
One word of caution, however; the difference between 
the return of the top quartile managers and the average 
manager is larger in venture than in any other asset 
grouping. So allocating capital to the best managers is a 
necessary condition to succeed. This is further supported 
by the work performed by Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan 
as it relates to persistence. Table A below looks at the 
PME of all venture capital funds ranked by quartile. 
The vertical axis represents the quartile ranking of the 
previous fund, one through four. The horizontal axis 
is the ranking of the next funds.  The PME included 
for those funds in each quartile is the column on the 
right. So funds which were in the first quartile have 
their next fund registered in the first quartile 49 percent 
of the time and those funds which are in the fourth 
quartile have their next fund in the fourth quartile 45 
percent of the time. The PME of the first quartile versus 
the fourth quartile is a whopping 2.85 versus 0.69. 
(Contrast this to the PME private equity where the PME 
difference between first and fourth quartiles is 0.25) This 
persistence of the best managers was consistent in the 
period before 2000 and well as the most recent decade.
Finally, in assessing where venture goes from here, as 
with private equity, we should not forget about the 
changes that are going on in the Emerging Markets. In 
China and India we have found terrific opportunities 
that have in many cases resulted in excellent returns. 
An interesting fact also highlights that innovation and 
disruptive technology are not the sole purview of Sand 
Hill Road in Menlo Park. In addition, today, immigrants 
make up 40 percent of STEM (Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Math) students in Master’s and 
Ph.D. programs.  The sheer number has ballooned to 
205,600 students as of 2011, according to Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement records, and with tighter 
immigration laws in the U.S., many of these non-U.S. 
students are returning to their home countries to be the 
entrepreneurs of the 21st century. But whether it is the 
U.S., Europe, China or India, the most important factor 
determining success in venture capital is access to the 
best and most persistent managers. 
Table A
Persistence in Performance | Are there good GPs? Historically, yes!
Current Fund Quartile
1 2 3 4 Total PME
Previous Fund Quartile PME
1 49.4% 20.5% 16.9% 13.3% 100% 2.85
2 28.0% 32.0% 26.7% 13.3% 100% 1.38
3 27.0% 30.2% 22.2% 20.6% 100% 1.34
4 3.9% 23.5% 27.5% 45.1% 100% 0.69
Source: Has Persistence Persisted in Private Equity? Evidence From Buyout and Venture Capital Funds Robert S. Harris*, Tim Jenkinson,** 
Steven N. Kaplan*** and Ruediger Stucke****, April 2013 Updated data from Prof Kaplan’s website http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/steven.
kaplan/research/kpe.pdf
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Hedge Funds
I have purposely waited until last to cover the topic 
of hedge funds. These are among the most enigmatic 
and mysterious of all of the strategies in the alternative 
bucket. It is also the asset grouping that has the highest 
allocation among alternatives in the nonprofit sector; 
and for the largest college and universities, allocations 
to hedge funds are higher than they are to U.S. equities 
at 19 percent versus 15 percent, respectively.  For 
institutional investors, hedge funds came to the fore 
in the early 2000’s when the Internet bubble burst. In 
that period hedge funds were flat to up a little when the 
equity markets were down 20+ percent. It was at that 
point that hedge fund asset growth really took off. 
Today, hedge fund assets under management are at an 
all-time high, yet net inflows have fallen to 2-3 percent 
annually from 11 percent pre-2008. Fewer funds are 
being launched and two-thirds of the industry is now 
concentrated with managers with more than $5 billion 
in assets under management. Clearly, hedge funds are a 
maturing industry, but does that mean they are no longer 
a good investment?
A recent Bloomberg Businessweek article, replete with 
provocative cover art and headline “Hedge Funds are 
For Suckers”, combined with recent weak industry 
performance relative to equity markets since the financial 
market crisis and high profile investigations by the SEC 
and others – have all served to fuel the debate on the 
value and role of hedge fund strategies in institutional 
portfolios.
As we have for private equity and venture capital, let’s 
look back on the factors that helped propel growth in 
hedge fund strategies among institutional investors.   
These have included:
•	 Diversification benefits
•	 Capital scarcity and unconstrained mandates
•	 Manager skill and “alpha”
•	 The use of leverage to boost returns
Diversification 
The first hedge funds were, indeed, designed to hedge.  
At least two centuries ago, millers and grain merchants 
on the agricultural commodities exchanges in Europe 
took long and short positions in different but related 
agricultural markets to protect themselves from sudden 
adverse moves in the prices of wheat, oats and other 
grains in which they dealt.  Over time, these principles 
began to be applied to trading in equities, bonds, 
currencies and other financial instruments.  The creation 
of the first modern hedge fund is often attributed to 
Alfred Winslow Jones, a former Fortune magazine writer. 
To reduce the effect of stock market fluctuations on his 
fund’s valuation, he both bought stocks and sold stocks 
short.
Unconstrained mandates 
In large part due to the unregulated nature of hedge 
funds, hedge fund managers had tremendous investment 
flexibility.  When we go back to the beginnings of 
hedge fund investing by nonprofits in the early eighties, 
the concept was quite simple. There were clearly 
opportunities to go beyond the pale of the traditional 
long-only investor. For the right and skillful manager 
the ability to go long or short, to be unconstrained 
around investments, to look for opportunities wherever 
they may be, to leverage and take a longer term time 
frame and not be forced into the consultant style boxes 
created large advantages for those investors which truly 
had skills. In addition, the alignment of incentives was 
a very appealing concept. The manager did not get rich 
unless the client did well. In the olden days hedge funds 
were relatively small with small and focused teams led by 
an investment guru.  Over time this Siren’s song of this 
structure was just too compelling for both investment 
professionals and institutions to ignore. If you were a 
good long only investor or worked with a bank’s capital 
how could you not want to escape the bounds of style 
buckets transparency, high levels of compliance and 
oversight to a land where none of those things existed 
and you could work for 2 percent base fees (versus 
fractions of a percent) and 20 percent of the profit. For 
investors, achieving unconstrained, low volatility, low 
correlation high returns this was almost too good to be 
true. 
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Manager Alpha 
Much of hedge fund investing in the early days was 
based on exploiting market inefficiencies; that is, having 
better information, tools or models that could take 
advantage of mispricings.  Hedge funds have historically 
been a “skill” game where investors paid up for superior 
investment talent with the expectation of outsized 
returns compared to traditional long-only strategies.
Leverage 
Given the flexibility underlying hedge fund strategies, 
the ability to use leverage was viewed as another tool to 
enhance performance.  Even in the early days of Alfred 
Winslow Jones, he employed leverage, borrowing money 
to invest in the portfolio and thereby increasing his long 
exposure.  Certainly, among the most notable uses of 
leverage was Long-Term Capital Management which 
used aggressive trading strategies to exploit minute 
pricing anomalies – then used high levels of leverage 
to generate high profits, only to collapse in a flight to 
liquidity.
Hedge Funds Today
So what has changed in this category over the last two 
decades and how should we think about hedge funds 
in the future? There is probably not an area of investing 
that has had more growth in the last twenty years. The 
industry has gone from a small group of gurus working 
with a limited amount of assets with small focused 
staffs, to a huge industry with more than 10,000 hedge 
funds with $2.3 trillion under management. (See Chart 
X).  There are now almost twice as many equity analysts 
working for hedge funds as for long only managers. 
Successful guru centric organizations have become mega 
firms with multi-strategy approaches and hundreds of 
employees running billions of dollars. We have also 
moved from the concept of just hedge funds to a number 
of style boxes that define the underlying strategy focus. 
The current breakdown of the assets allocated to these 
style boxes are outlined in Chart XI. So if hedge funds 
can generate good non-correlated returns (even after 
fees) doesn’t it make sense to allocate capital to this area?  
And, have hedge funds lived up to their promise?  Let’s 
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Diversification 
The growth and maturation of the hedge fund industry 
has led to a blurring of the diversification benefits in 
large part because many so-called hedge fund strategies 
over the two decades have been nothing more than high 
priced beta exposures.  As evidence, aggregate hedge 
fund correlations (as measured by the HFRI Fund 
Weighted Composite4) relative to the S&P 500 index 
have risen steadily from about 40 percent to more than 
70 percent.  
However, a universe-wide look at correlations reasserts that 
the risk and return properties of a hedge fund allocation 
are not simply a function of the broad equity market.  
As the total number of funds has risen within the HFRI 
universe, so too has the number of funds that are highly 
correlated to broad equity markets. However, as noted in 
Chart XII below, there has been a greater increase in the 
number of managers with less than 10 percent of their 
return explained by the S&P 500 Index than any other 
group.  This tells us that diversification still lives, but the 
devil is in the details for investors who seek to construct 
portfolios.
The benefit of diversification is also evident in the 
measure of downside protection and the power of 
compounding demonstrated in Chart XIII below. The 
chart illustrates that over the time frame from 1990 until 
today the HFRI index has outperformed both stocks and 
4Note: The HFRI is an index of hedge fund returns as reported to 
Hedge Fund Research, Inc.   
bonds with much of the relative return benefit coming in 
that very difficult early 2000’s period.
The downside protection benefit came during those 
periods where it was needed most in fiscal 2008 and 
2009 where the average hedge funds used by colleges 
and universities returned 3 percent and down 12 percent 
versus the S&P 500 which was down 10.2 percent and 
25.5 percent in those two years. So despite all the hand 
wringing and concern (not to mention the number of 
billionaires created) hedge funds did what they were 
supposed to (although there will always be some who 
want them to do more). For the ten years ended June 30, 
2012 the compounded return of the hedge fund portion 
of the average college and university was 5.48 percent 
net of fees. This was 15 basis points higher than the S&P 
500 return for the same period. However, the key statistic 
may be that the annualized standard deviation was less 
than half of the S&P 500 at 7.6 percent versus 16.7 percent 
for the equity market index.
Capital Scarcity and Unconstrained Mandates 
The starting point in thinking about hedge funds going 
forward has to be the significant increase in the dollars 
being allocated to these strategies, increasing by about 
five times over the last decade. It is this cash flow that has 
transformed small shops with concentrated intellectual 
capital into behemoths with tens of billions of dollars 
to deploy. If in fact there are only so many mispriced 
positions in the market, the amount of capital chasing 
these mispricings should quickly identify and close 
any discrepancies.  This would certainly support the 
Chart XII
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argument by some that future long term returns among 
hedge funds will not be worth the fees they charge. 
Further, with industry consolidation, many of the 
funds have become large businesses and the near death 
experience that hit the industry in 2008 and 2009 has 
management teams more highly focus on maintaining 
the business than generating high rates of risk adjusted 
returns. Looking to the future, finding those managers 
that are not too small to support the infrastructure 
necessary under Dodd-Frank but not too big to be able 
to find opportunities where size does not overwhelm 
mispricing, becomes the critical task.
Manager Alpha 
Related to the point above regarding the risk of too 
much capital chasing too little opportunity is the 
question as to whether or not skill still matters, and 
whether top-tier hedge fund managers are still capable 
of generating consistent alpha (and not beta cloaked as 
alpha).  In a 2011 study by Ibbotson, Chen and Zhu 
published by the CFA Institute, the authors concluded 
that hedge funds generated 300 basis points of alpha 
per annum in the period from 1995 – 2009.  This study 
represented an update to the 1999 study by Brown, 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson which found statistically 
significant alphas in the hedge fund industry from 1989 
– 2009.  The 2011 study also concluded over the 15 year 
period that each of nine underlying hedge fund strategies 
contributed positive annual alpha.
The expectation of double digit returns from the hedge 
funds with very little downside risk is a thing of the 
past. It is a manager skill game that should provide 
returns that are over the bond rate but below the equity 
markets. The good news is that they still should provide 
downside protection in difficult market environments 
and compound at a rate of return even after fees that 
is in line with the equity markets. As to individual 
managers and strategies the effective use of this becomes 
paramount. Being able to shift between the various style 
buckets based on market conditions should enhance 
returns over the benchmarks. 
Leverage 
A recent headwind to hedge fund performance is the 
very low interest rate environment.  Hedge funds earn 
interest (called rebates) on short positions and pay 
interest on margin amounts. Since many long/short 
hedge funds today do not add a lot of leverage, the 
interest on the shorts serves as a value enhancer to the 
return. With interest rebate near zero and in some cases 
having to pay interest in the shorts will reduce the overall 
returns of the funds.  Normalized interest rates will likely 
reduce this headwind in the years to come.
Notwithstanding some claims otherwise, hedge funds 
have largely delivered on the promise of diversification, 
downside protection and the resulting benefits of 
positive compounding over the last two decades, the 
period of the financial market crisis included.  But the 
industry is in the midst of significant regulatory change, 
and the last four years since the financial market crisis 
(coinciding with the fifth strongest U.S. equity bull 
market in history) has given pause to some investors who 
(unrealistically) expected hedge fund strategies to keep 
up more effectively with this raging bull.  
The impact of Dodd-Frank remains unclear, but could 
actually be a net positive. The Volker rule – a section 
of the Dodd-Frank Act – and other capital focused 
regulation has really taken the banks out of the hedge 
fund business both in terms of sponsorship and trading 
bank capital with a hedge fund approach. In days past 
banks and investment banks used a significant amount of 
their own capital to perform hedge fund-like activities. 
The trades may have been done in trading books assisting 
with customer flows or in standalone trading strategies. 
Today many if not all of these activities have been 
curtailed partly because the fact that these companies are 
now public and subject to earnings disappointment and 
more recently Dodd-Frank and Basil III since the crisis. 
It is difficult to estimate how much bank and investment 
bank capital has left the market as a result of this major 
change in the regulatory environment. 
The second tail wind is the cost of transacting in public 
markets. The transition over the years to electronic 
trading platforms has significantly reduced the cost of 
trading in the public exchanges around the world. This 
has led to higher volatility in the markets. However, 
with banks leaving market-making activities in some of 
the less liquid markets (the OTC bond and derivative 
markets) the cost may increase going forward.  The 
addition of a liquid ETF market has made the ability to 
hedge a lot easier and cheaper. This development means 
that short positions can be taken much more cheaply 
and with great cost efficiency.
18Alternatives Reality: What to Expect from Future Allocations December 2013
Summary
Historically, alternative investment strategies have 
delivered on their promise.  Private equity and venture 
capital have provided returns well above public market 
equities. And, hedge funds have provided alpha across 
market cycles and have protected in down markets.  
Furthermore, this performance has held true on a net of 
fees basis.
But these statements are not without qualifiers. 
Most important, investment talent is key, as median 
performance is less likely to provide consistent 
outperformance relative to traditional long-only 
strategies.  So deploying capital with top-tier investment 
managers in private equity and venture capital and across 
hedge fund strategies is necessary in order to achieve 
attractive risk adjusted returns.  
So what does the future hold for alternatives?  We 
believe that the fundamental principles and drivers of 
investment performance that have propelled returns 
for alternatives over the last two decades are largely 
unchanged.  While it is true that there is more capital in 
these strategies and that there are many more managers, 
allocations to these strategies as a percentage of global 
equity market capitalization remains relatively small.  
But the one truism of the past is even more pronounced 
today: an “index-like” approach to alternative investment 
strategies will certainly disappoint.
Perpetual and other long-term asset pools such as 
endowments and foundations and pension funds, 
have not been able to maintain purchasing power 
over the last generation by simply allocating to a basic 
mix of passively managed equities and bonds.  Active 
management of long-only strategies will only bridge 
part of the gap.   As such, we believe that significant 
allocations to alternative strategies – thoughtfully 
constructed, with top-tier managers – are necessary to 
preserve intergenerational equity and thus fulfill the 
long-term missions and obligations of institutional 
investors.
The “right” allocation to alternative strategies, often a 
function of the level of illiquidity an institution can 
maintain, is among the most important decisions facing 
governing boards and investment committees today. 
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Market Commentary  
Information, opinions, or commentary concerning the financial 
markets, economic conditions, or other topical subject matter 
are prepared, written, or created prior to posting on this Report 
and do not reflect current, up-to-date, market or economic 
conditions. Commonfund disclaims any responsibility to update such 
information, opinions, or commentary. 
To the extent views presented forecast market activity, they may be 
based on many factors in addition to those explicitly stated in this 
Report. Forecasts of experts inevitably differ. Views attributed to 
third parties are presented to demonstrate the existence of points of 
view, not as a basis for recommendations or as investment advice. 
Managers who may or may not subscribe to the views expressed 
in this Report make investment decisions for funds maintained by 
Commonfund or its affiliates. The views presented in this Report may 
not be relied upon as an indication of trading intent on behalf of any 
Commonfund fund, or of any Commonfund managers. 
Market and investment views of third parties presented in this 
Report do not necessarily reflect the views of Commonfund and 
Commonfund disclaims any responsibility to present its views on the 
subjects covered in statements by third parties.
Statements concerning Commonfund Group’s views of possible 
future outcomes in any investment asset class or market, or of 
possible future economic developments, are not intended, and 
should not be construed, as forecasts or predictions of the future 
investment performance of any Commonfund Group fund. Such 
statements are also not intended as recommendations by any 
Commonfund Group entity or employee to the recipient of the 
presentation. It is Commonfund Group’s policy that investment 
recommendations to investors must be based on the investment 
objectives and risk tolerances of each individual investor. All 
market outlook and similar statements are based upon information 
reasonably available as of the date of this presentation (unless 
an earlier date is stated with regard to particular information), 
and reasonably believed to be accurate by Commonfund Group. 
Commonfund Group disclaims any responsibility to provide the 
recipient of this presentation with updated or corrected information. 
Important Legal Disclosure
Commonfund Asset Management Company, Inc., a subsidiary of 
The Common Fund for Nonprofit Organizations, is responsible for 
the statements made in this paper. References to “Commonfund” 
are references to Commonfund Asset Management Company, or 
as the context may require, collectively to Commonfund Asset 
Management Company and its affiliates.
Any statements about particular securities or types of securities 
should not be relied upon as advice to buy or sell or hold such 
securities or as an offer to sell such securities. Moreover, any views 
presented are based on market or other conditions as of the date of 
this report, or as otherwise indicated, and Commonfund disclaims 
any responsibility to update such views. Particular investment 
decisions should be based on many factors; the persons who have 
prepared this report do not know all the factors pertinent to your 
circumstances.
To the extent views presented forecast market activity, they may be 
based on many factors in addition to those explicitly stated in this 
report. Forecasts of experts inevitably differ. Views attributed to 
third parties are presented to demonstrate the existence of points of 
view, not as a basis for recommendations or as investment advice. 
Managers who may or may not subscribe to the views expressed 
in this report make investment decisions for funds maintained by 
Commonfund. The views presented in this report may not be relied 
upon as an indication of the trading intent of managers controlling 
Commonfund funds.
It is possible that you may lose money on an investment in any 
Commonfund fund or on any other investment in stocks or bonds 
or other instruments to which this report may be deemed to relate, 
directly or indirectly. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to 
future performance. Income from investments may fluctuate.
The securities of small, less well-known companies may be more 
volatile than those of larger companies. 
Investments in foreign securities involve greater risks than U.S. 
investments. These risks include the political and economic 
uncertainties of foreign countries, as well as the risk of currency 
fluctuation. Changes in rates of exchange may have an adverse 
effect on the value, price of, or income derived from an investment.
Risk Disclosure 
There are significant risks associated with investing in commodities, 
natural resources and real property. Commodity prices, including 
gas, oil, timber and other natural resources, can be highly volatile. 
Price movements for commodity futures are influenced by, among 
other things: changing supply and demand relationships; weather; 
agricultural, trade, fiscal, monetary, and exchange control programs 
and policies of governments; United States and foreign political and 
economic events and policies; changes in national and international 
interest rates and rates of inflation; currency devaluations and 
revaluations; and, emotions of the marketplace. Investments in real 
property may fluctuate in value due to general economic conditions, 
a weak market for real estate generally, changing supply and 
demand for certain types of properties, and natural disasters or 
man-made events.
